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Much has been written in the last few decades on the content of Kant’s
moral law, but relatively little on its scope. That is, there has been much
discussion on how we should treat morally relevant others, but far less
discussion of who or what we should count as morally relevant others.
Before jumping into my argument let me say a few words on my
terminology.
A Few Remarks about Terminology
Firstly, by “human” in the morally relevant sense I mean those who are
demanding of moral respect in the Kantian sense. Some Kantians today,
often worried about the moral status of non-human animals, make a
distinction between diﬀerent types of morally relevant others. On the
one hand there are organisms that are free and rational and are deserving
of moral respect and are members of the sphere of justice. On other hand
there are non-rational sentient beings that are capable of feeling pain and
are deserving of compassion and concern. Kant himself clearly rejects this
distinction, as he thinks our duties toward non-human nature are indirect,
being rooted in duties toward ourselves. I am open to such a distinction
and think that there are parts of nature that demand a certain type of
concern even though they do not demand respect. However, in this
chapter, when I talk of “morally relevant others” or being “human” in
the morally relevant sense I will mean those beings that are demanding of
respect in the ﬁrst sense. Such organisms are members of the sphere of
justice and our relations toward them involve considerations of fairness
and mutual respect. Commonly those who draw a line between rational
and non-rational nature implicitly assume that this boundary corresponds
to the division between language-using and non-linguistic organisms. The
assumption being that rationality presupposes linguistic capacities. In this
chapter, however, I will argue that the boundary cannot be deﬁned in
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terms of the distinction between the linguistic and non-linguistic, and the
account I oﬀer leaves space for the possibility that there are non-linguistic
beings that are deserving of respect in the Kantian sense.
Secondly, I often talk of “moral status attribution.” By this I mean the
judgment (which I think normally doesn’t involve any inference) that a bit
of the world around us is deserving of respect in the Kantian sense. By
talking about “attribution” rather than “recognition” I mean to remain
neutral about whether such attribution is justiﬁed or correct. As such,
moral status attribution is something that can be studied empirically as
part of a naturalistic science. The question of whether such attribution is
justiﬁed or correct is a separate issue. When I am assuming that such
attribution is correct, I will talk of “recognition” of the moral status of
others.
Thirdly, as we shall see, Kant himself does not identify being “human”
in the morally relevant sense with being a member of a particular biological
species. Thus, being “human” in the moral sense is not to be identiﬁed
with being biologically human. In order to avoid ambiguity, when I intend
to talk about humanity in the moral sense I will use the word “human” in
quotation marks. When I want to talk about being human in the biological
sense I will use the word without inverted commas.
Finally, I do not often explicitly talk about freedom in this chapter.
However, Kant himself identiﬁes being “human” in the morally relevant
sense with being free, in the sense of either being autonomous or having
the capacity for autonomy. So this chapter could have been titled “recog-
nizing freedom.” Elsewhere I have argued that the capacity for autonomy
should be identiﬁed with the capacity to be a member of a realm of ends.
In this chapter I develop this idea, appealing to recent work in develop-
mental psychology and primatology, and suggest that this capacity for
autonomy (the capacity to be a member of a realm of ends) can be
understood in terms of the capacity to engage in shared cooperative
activity. Hopefully my reasons for this should become clearer through
the chapter.
 Introduction
On the surface Kant himself seems quite clear about who is deserving of
respect: The morally relevant others are all “rational, free beings” or all
“human beings.” It is clear, however, that Kant does not want to identify
 Thorpe , , and .
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“human beings” in this sense with members of a particular biological
species, for he is explicitly open to the idea that there might be non-
biologically human rational beings. Thus, for example he is explicitly open
to the possibility of extraterrestrial rational beings, who would not be
members of the same biological species as us, but who would, presumably
be worthy of respect. And it would seem possible that there are members
of our biological species who are not “human” in the morally relevant
sense. For example, it is possible that Kant might think that some severely
brain damaged biological human beings, and perhaps psychopaths, are not
“human” in the morally relevant sense. Given these facts, a Kantian needs
to give some account of how we are to recognize who or what counts as
“human” in the morally relevant sense.
There are a number of distinct questions a Kantian faces when dealing
with the question of what is involved in recognizing the “humanity” of
others, and appealing to a concrete example may help clarify this issue.
John is sitting on the chair in front of me. If I were to take the chair he was
sitting on home and saw it in half, this might be a stupid thing to do; it
might even be illegal, if I do not own the chair. There would, however, be
nothing intrinsically wrong with the action. Sawing John in half, on the
other hand, whatever I think of him, would not only be wrong, it would be
reprehensible. Splitting the atom is ﬁne, splitting John is not. But why?
What’s the diﬀerence? Kant’s answer is that John is a diﬀerent type of
being from the chair, and a type of being that demands respect. Following
Kant, I will name the type of being that John is “human” (in the morally
relevant sense), a rational being, a moral subject or a person, and in this
chapter I will treat these terms as co-extensional. Now, for Kant there
is no (logical) contradiction involved in judging that the chair is a person
and John is not. To respect the chair but not the person sitting on it
would not be a theoretical mistake but a moral, practical one. If I decided
to saw John in half I would not be making a theoretical mistake about
his true nature, but would be doing something morally reprehensible.
 Thus in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View he writes that, “The highest species concept
may be that of a terrestrial rational being, however we will not be able to name its character because
we have no knowledge of non-terrestrial rational beings that would enable us to indicate their
characteristic property and so to characterize this terrestrial being among rational beings in
general. It seems, therefore, that the problem of indicating the character of the human species is
absolutely insoluble, because the solution would have to be made through experience by means of
the comparison of two species of rational being, but experience does not oﬀer us this” (Anth :).
 Following Kant, I will use the term “human being” in a moral sense, allowing for the possibility that
there are possibly some biological human beings who are not human in the moral sense and possibly
some beings that are not biologically human that are human in the moral sense.
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We attribute a certain moral status to John but not to the chair, and this
raises at least three questions:
() What is the content of this judgment? In other words, what is it to be
“human” in the morally relevant sense?
() How do we, in fact, go about ascribing moral status to others?
() What, if anything, justiﬁes this ascription?
This chapter has three main sections. In the ﬁrst two, I examine Kant’s
answers to these three questions. In the ﬁnal section I discuss recent work
in developmental psychology that supports what I take to be the Kantian
thesis that we have a natural capacity to recognize the humanity of others,
and I suggest a reformulation of Kant’s position in contemporary terms.
In terms of the ﬁrst question, I will argue that to be “human” in the
morally relevant sense is to have the capacity for morality, and that this
involves: (a) the capacity to recognize others as ends rather than merely as
means and (b) the capacity to enter into relations of ethical community
with us.
In terms of the second and third questions, we need to remember that
whenever we ask a “how do we know that p?” question we should be
careful about the fact that this question contains two distinct questions: ()
The “how question.” The answer to this can be a naturalistic, mechanistic,
causal story. This has to do with how we go about making certain
attributions. () The “epistemic question.” The answer to this is essentially
normative. This has to do with whether our attributions are justiﬁed. Our
answers to the “how question” and the “epistemic question” may or may
not be related. For example, in contemporary reliabilist accounts in
epistemology the “how” and the “epistemic” questions are related; for
reliabilists argue that if how we make an attribution is the result of a
reliable process (and the attribution is true), then we know. So our answer
to the question: “How do I know that John, but not the chair he is sitting
on, deserves moral respect?” has two aspects: () How do we, in fact, go
about making such moral status attributions? This seems to be an empir-
ical question. () What (if anything) justiﬁes such moral status
attributions?
In a recent paper, Paul Guyer has suggested that our recognition of
morally relevant others is based upon an argument from analogy. It is not
clear whether he is oﬀering this as an account both of how we go about
attributing moral status to others and an account of what justiﬁes such
attribution, or whether this is merely meant to be an account of what
justiﬁes such attribution. I will assume, however, that his account is
  
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supposed to be an answer both to the how question and the justiﬁcation
question. And I will oﬀer criticisms of it as an answer to both questions.
I will defend, in contrast, a version of what I call moral reliabilism. It is
not clear that this is the position Kant himself took, as he does not himself
oﬀer a detailed account of what is involved in the recognition of the
humanity of others, but I will argue this is the most plausible position
for a contemporary Kantian ethicist to take. Moral reliabilism consists of
two claims.
Firstly, there is the empirical, naturalistic claim that (a) we have a quasi-
perceptual capacity to directly ascribe moral status to various bits of the
world around us. I will argue that this capacity is best thought of in
Gibsonian terms as a capacity to pick up on certain types of social
aﬀordances; morally relevant others have the capacity to engage in ethical
interaction with us, and recognizing the humanity of others involves
picking up on this capacity. Those beings who are “human” in the morally
relevant sense, then, aﬀord interaction based on mutual respect. I will
explain what I mean by this in more detail later in the chapter.
Secondly, there is the normative claim that, (b) we should assume as a
postulate of practical reason that this capacity is reliable (although fallible).
I suggest, then, that the most plausible story to tell here is that we have a
natural (biological) capacity to recognize the humanity of others, and we
must make a moral assumption that this capacity can reliably pick out the
morally relevant bits of the phenomenal world around us. In Kantian
terms we can think of the assumption that this natural capacity is norma-
tively reliable as a postulate of practical reason. For our moral practice
presupposes that we can reliably recognize morally relevant others, and so
if morality is not to be an empty ﬁgment of our imagination we must
assume (for moral, not theoretical reasons) that our capacity to identify
which beings are deserving of respect is reliable.
At the heart of my position is a particular understanding of what it is to
be “human” in the morally relevant sense. There has been much disagree-
ment among Kant scholars as to what it is to be “human” in the morally
relevant sense. Kant himself seems to identify being “human” with rational
nature. But this has been interpreted in numerous ways. There are three
main broad interpretations of what it is to be “human” in the morally
relevant sense.
Firstly, some commentators, such as Christine Korsgaard and Allen
Wood, identify “humanity” with the capacity for agency broadly under-
stood. Thus, for example, Christine Korsgaard identiﬁes “humanity” with
the capacity to set ends arguing that, “[b]y ‘humanity’ Kant means the
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power of free rational choice, for ‘the capacity to propose an end to oneself
is the characteristic of humanity’” (TL :) (Korsgaard a:).
Similarly, Allen Wood identiﬁes “humanity” with the capacity to set and
to systematize ends. Thus Wood argues,
The predisposition to humanity lies in between the predispositions to
animality and personality. It encompasses all our rational capacities having
no speciﬁc reference to morality. Put most generally, humanity is the
capacity to set ends through reason. . . It enables us not only to set ends
but to compare the ends we set and organize them into a system. . . Hence
humanity also involves the capacity to form the idea of our happiness or
well-being as a whole. (Wood :–)
Secondly, many commentators stress that “humanity” essentially involves
the capacity for morality. So, for example, John Rawls argues that,
Kant means by humanity those of our powers and capacities that charac-
terize us as reasonable and rational persons who belong to the natural
world. . . These powers include, ﬁrst, those of moral personality, which
make it possible for us to have a good will and a good moral character; and
second, those capacities and skills to be developed by culture: by the arts
and sciences and so forth. (Rawls :)
A similar position, stressing that “humanity” in the morally relevant sense
involves our capacity for morality, is defended by, among others, Thomas
E. Hill, Barbara Herman, and Onora O’Neill.
Finally, Richard Dean has argued that “humanity” should be identiﬁed
not merely with the capacity for morality, but with the possession of a
good will. Thus he has argued that,
Humanity, in the sense of the humanity formulation, is indeed equivalent
to some feature possessed by rational beings, but not by all minimally
rational beings. Instead, “humanity” is Kant’s name for the more fully
rational nature that is only possessed by a being who actually accepts moral
principles as providing suﬃcient reasons for action. The humanity that
should be treated as an end in itself is a properly ordered will, which gives
priority to moral considerations over self-interest. To employ Kant’s ter-
minology, the end in itself is a good will.
 Thus, Thomas E. Hill (:) argues that “Our humanity includes our capacity and disposition to
follow the allegedly unconditional rational supreme principle of morality.” And Onora O’Neill
(:) argues that “Rational beings presumably must be non-conditional values because they
alone can will anything, hence they alone can have a good will.” See also Herman :.
 Dean :. See also Dean :–.
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Although I have some sympathy for Richard Dean’s account, in this
chapter I will assume a version of the second position, namely that
“humanity” in the morally relevant sense involves our capacity for moral-
ity. This capacity for morality can be understood as the capacity to
interact with others on the basis of mutual respect, or as the capacity to
become a member of a certain type of moral community (a realm of ends).
I take these two characterizations to be extensionally equivalent. According
to such a reading, it is only those bits of the phenomenal world that are
capable of morality that demand moral respect. Now, many of those who
defend such a reading take the ﬁrst formulation of the categorical impera-
tive as primary, and so suggest that it is only those beings that are capable
of moral reasoning that are deserving of respect. Such a position, I believe,
is overly intellectualist. One might think that only language-using crea-
tures are capable of moral reasoning and so only such creatures are
deserving of respect. In contrast, I defend a position that takes the second
and third formulation of the categorical imperatives seriously and will
argue that those beings which are deserving of respect are those who are
(a) capable of recognizing others as ends and not merely as means and
(b) capable of entering into relations of ethical community with us. On
this approach it may turn out, as a contingent fact, that the only beings
who are deserving of respect are those with linguistic capacities. But it is
at least logically possible that there are creatures not capable of language
which are capable of interaction based on mutual respect and of forming
relations of ethical community with us. And in the ﬁnal section of this
chapter I will argue that there is evidence that pre-linguistic babies are such
organisms, and that it is an open question whether there are non-human
animals which have such capacities.
According to this position, there is no theoretical criterion we can apply
to determine which individuals we are capable of forming such relations
with, and so the only way to try and determine which individuals are
deserving of respect is to try and form such relations with them. Recogniz-
ing the humanity of others is a matter of knowing how rather than
knowing that.
Drawing on recent research in developmental psychology and primat-
ology, especially the work of Tomasello and his associates, I will defend a
 Epistemically the “capacity for morality” reading and the “good will” reading could be reconciled if
we were to assume that every being that has a capacity for morality will ultimately realize this
capacity, and so having the capacity for morality and being moral are equivalent. I think Kant
sometimes ﬂirts with such a position.
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modiﬁed version of what I take to be Kant’s account. This research
suggests that, unlike non-human animals, healthy human beings develop
a capacity, between the ages of six months and two years, to engage in joint
or shared cooperative activities. My suggestion is that what it is to be
“human” (in a morally relevant sense) is to be a being we can engage in
shared cooperative activities with. Tomasello and associates have sug-
gested that it is this capacity that diﬀerentiates humans from non-human
animals. Drawing on the work of Bratman (), they argue that joint
cooperative activities have three essential characteristics:
() the interactants are mutually responsive to one another, () there is a
shared goal in the sense that each participant has the goal the we (in mutual
knowledge) do X together, and () the participants coordinate their plans
of action and intentions some way down the hierarchy. . . the cognitive
representation of the [joint] goal contains both self and other; that is, it
contains not only the self’s goal that the box be open, but also the self’s goal
that this be accomplished with the partner. (Tomasello, et al. : )
And they provide evidence to show how this capacity slowly develops
(and has its basis in simpler capacities) between the age of six months and
two years. One thing Tomasello and his associates stress is that the capacity
to engage in joint cooperative activities presupposes a capacity for joint
attention, which they believe is not to be found in non-human animals.
And I will argue later in the chapter that joint attention itself should be
 I will use “joint cooperative activity” and “shared cooperative activity” interchangeably. A joint
cooperative activity is a shared cooperative activity involving only two individuals.
 Elsewhere I argue that Kant’s ethics should be understood as an “ethics of interaction,” for the idea
of a realm of ends is the idea of a community in which there is real interaction, and so, for Kant, to
be moral is to strive to really interact with others. I am suggesting here that we should understand
interaction in terms of engaging in joint cooperative activities.
 Thus Moll and Tomasello, reporting on their own research, claim that although chimpanzees are
“mutually responsive,” “In none of the tasks did a chimpanzee ever make a communicative attempt
to re-engage the partner. . . The absence of any eﬀorts by the chimpanzees to re-engage their human
partner is crucial: it shows that the chimpanzees did not cooperate in the true sense, since they had
not formed a joint goal with the human. If they had been committed to a joint goal, then we would
expect them, at least in some instances, to persist in trying to bring it about and in trying to keep the
cooperation going. For humans the situation is diﬀerent from very early on in ontogeny. [within
months] when the adult stopped participating at a certain point during the activity, every child at
least once produced a communicative attempt in order to re-engage him. . . [H]uman infants by the
age of  months, in contrast to apes, are able to jointly commit to a shared goal” (Moll and
Tomasello :).
 Thus, Moll and Tomasello (:) claim that although “apes do sometimes point for
humans . . . it seems that what the apes have learned from their experience with humans is that
the human will help them, and that they can use the pointing gesture instrumentally in order to
make him help them. . . However, no ape has ever been observed to point for another ape or for a
human declaratively – that is, just for the sake of sharing attention to some outside entity, or to
inform others of things cooperatively, as humans often do. . . [E]ven when they ﬁrst begin to point
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thought of as a basic type of joint cooperative activity. They reach the
(provisional) conclusion that it is this capacity that distinguishes human
beings from non-human animals. This suggestion that only biologically
human beings are capable of joint cooperative activity, however, has been
controversial and many primatologists, especially those using more of an
ethnographic methodology, believe that some non-human primates are
capable of some forms of joint cooperative activity.
The capacity to engage in such shared cooperative activities involves
both a motivational element and a cognitive element. In order to engage
in shared cooperative activities, organisms must have the motivation to
cooperate, and must also have various cognitive capacities, for example
the capacities to represent shared goals, the capacity for role reversal, and
the capacity for joint attention. Although Tomasello is engaged in a
naturalistic project of explanation, I suggest that this account of what it
is to be human corresponds to the Kantian understanding of what it is
to be “human” in a morally relevant sense, and that the morally relevant
others are those we can engage in joint cooperative activities with. It is
interesting that Moll and Tomasello also suggest that the capacity to
engage in joint cooperative activities lies at the heart of our moral capaci-
ties. Thus they claim that,
[p]erspectival cognitive representations and the understanding of beliefs
also pave the way for what may be called, very generally, collective inten-
tionality. . . That is, the essentially social nature of perspectival cognitive
at around  year of age, human infants do this with a full range of diﬀerent motives, including the
motive to share attention.”
 “Although non-human animals may engage with one another in complex social interactions in
which they know the goals of one another and exploit this, they are not motivated to create shared
goals to which they are jointly committed in the same ways as humans” Moll and Tomasello
(:).
 I am not suggesting that we have no moral duties to those beings which we can’t engage in joint
cooperative activities with. Kant himself believes that we have no direct duties toward non-human
animals, but rather that our duties to non-human animals are indirect, being based on a duty
toward ourselves. His basic argument is that cruelty toward animals can cause us to become callous
and that we have a duty toward ourselves not to be callous. Thus, Kant explains in theMetaphysics of
Morals, that, “with regard to the animate but non-rational part of creation, violent and cruel
treatment of animals is far more intimately opposed to a human being’s duty to himself, and he has
a duty to refrain from this; for it dulls his shared feeling of their suﬀering and so weakens and
gradually uproots a natural predisposition that is very serviceable to morality in one’s relationship
with other people” (MS :). I suggest a more plausible account would be to argue that there are
two types of morally relevant others: those to whom we have duties of respect (which I have
suggested consists of all those beings with which we can engage in joint cooperative activities with)
and those toward which we have a duty of care (which would include at least most living beings, and
perhaps all beings). In this chapter I have only concerned myself with morally relevant others
understood in terms of those to whom we have duties of respect.
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representations enables children, later in the preschool period, to construct
the generalized social norms that make possible the creation of social-
institutional facts, such as money, marriage and government, whose reality
is grounded totally in the collective practices and beliefs of a social group
conceived generally. . . Importantly, when children internalize generalized
collective conventions and norms and use them to regulate their own
behaviour, this provides for a new kind of social rationality (morality)
involving what Searle calls “desire-independent reasons for action.” At this
point, children have become norm following participants in institutional
reality, that is to say, fully functioning members of their cultural group.
(Moll and Tomasello :)
I have argued that Kant’s ethics can be understood as an ethics of
interaction, and my suggestion at the end of this chapter is that the best
way of interpreting this in contemporary terms is to claim that the morally
relevant others are those we are capable of engaging in joint cooperative
activity with. If this is the case, then we have no criterion or principle to
pick out which bits of the world are human in the morally relevant sense,
for the only way we have of establishing whether a being is the sort we can
engage in a joint cooperative activity with is to try and do so.
One way of thinking about this capacity to engage in shared cooperative
activity is in terms of possessing certain types of social “aﬀordances.” The
notion of an aﬀordance was introduced by the ecological psychologist
J. J. Gibson. Gibson argues that aﬀordances are to be understood in terms
of the possibilities of action that the environment oﬀers an organism, and
he argues that in perception organisms are able to directly pick up on
such aﬀordances. On the account I am proposing, being “human” in the
morally relevant sense is to be understood in terms of the possession of
certain types of social aﬀordance. Such social aﬀordances are not to be
understood in terms of the possibility of action oﬀered by an object or
environmental feature, but in terms of the possibility of interaction oﬀered
by another organism. Morally relevant others have the capacity to interact
with us in a cooperative way, such that we are able to engage in shared
cooperative activities with them. To recognize the “humanity” of others is
to pick up on this possibility of interaction. Gibson explains the notion of
an aﬀordance in the following terms:
The aﬀordances of the environment are what it oﬀers the animal, what it
provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb to aﬀord is found in
the dictionary, but the noun aﬀordance is not. I have made it up. I mean by
it something that refers to both the environment and the animal in a way
that no existing term does. . . If a terrestrial surface is nearly horizontal
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(instead of slanted), nearly ﬂat (instead of convex or concave), and suﬃ-
ciently extended (relative to the size of the animal) and if its substance is
rigid (relative to the weight of the animal), then the surface aﬀords support.
It is a surface of support, and we call it a substratum, ground, or ﬂoor. It is
stand-on-able, permitting an upright posture for quadrupeds and bipeds. It
is therefore walk-on-able and run-over-able. It is not sink-into-able like a
surface of water or a swamp, that is, not for heavy terrestrial animals.
Support for water bugs is diﬀerent. . . Note that the four properties listed –
horizontal, ﬂat, extended, and rigid – would be physical properties of a
surface if they were measured with the scales and standard units used in
physics. As an aﬀordance of support for a species of animal, however, they
have to be measured relative to the animal. (Gibson : )
Aﬀordances, then, are the possibilities of action an environment oﬀers
an organism. Thus, for example, a pathway through a cluttered environ-
ment is an aﬀordance as it allows for locomotion between two points. An
opening in a horizontal surface, such as a doorway, is also an aﬀordance in
that it oﬀers the possibility of passing-through. Now, I suggest that there
are social aﬀordances. These should be understood not in terms of the
possibility of action, but in terms of the possibility of interaction.
Now, even non-human primates are able to pick up on some social
aﬀordances. For example, chimpanzees are able to recognize a hand-raise
signal as an invitation to play. In so doing, chimpanzees are able to
recognize certain possibilities of interaction. Now, I suggest that organisms
that are “human” in the morally relevant sense possess the capacity to
engage in certain types of interaction with us: namely, interaction that
involves mutual respect and allows for shared cooperative activity. Thus,
our capacity to recognize the “humanity” of others involves the capacity to
pick up on the possibility of such interaction. To be “human” is to invite
others to interact on the basis of mutual respect, and to recognize the
“humanity” is to pick up on such an invitation.
The account I am oﬀering has an essentially ﬁrst person plural starting
point: To pick up on the humanity of others is to implicitly recognize the
 Tomasello (:) explains how chimpanzees develop this capacity to pick up on a hand-raise as
an invitation to play in the following terms:
(i) initially one youngster approaches another with rough-and-tumble play in mind, raises his
arm in preparation to play-hit the other, and then actually hits, jumps on, and begins playing;
(ii) over repeated instances, the recipient learns to anticipate this sequence on the basis of the
initial arm-raise alone, and so begins to play upon perceiving this initial step; and
(iii) the communicator eventually learns to anticipate this anticipation, and so raises his arm,
monitors the recipient, and waits for her to react – expecting this arm-raise to initiate
the play.
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possibility of becoming a “we.” In contrast, Guyer’s account, which will be
examined later in the chapter, has an essentially ﬁrst person singular
starting point. According to Guyer, I start by recognizing my own moral
status, and then judge that others are demanding of moral respect because
they are relevantly similar to me.
The reason I think that this implies that there is no theoretical criterion
to decide whether another bit of the world is “human” in the morally
relevant sense is because, following Gibson, I think there is a clear
diﬀerence between picking up on an aﬀordance, on the one hand, and
classifying or labeling an object on the other. To pick up on an aﬀordance
involves a type of know-how, rather than classifying an object theoretically;
it involves knowing how an object can be used or interacted with. As
Gibson explains,
The theory of aﬀordances rescues us from the philosophical muddle of
assuming ﬁxed classes of objects, each deﬁned by its common features and
then given a name. As Ludwig Wittgenstein knew, you cannot specify the
necessary and suﬃcient features of the class of things to which a name
is given. They have only a “family resemblance.” But this does not mean
you cannot learn how to use things and perceive their uses. You do not
have to classify and label things in order to perceive what they aﬀord.
(Gibson :)
Learning how we can interact with various bits of the world involves
trying to interact and learning which bits of the world allow for what
types of interaction. This involves a practical rather than a theoretical
capacity. It involves knowing-how rather than knowing-that. Those bits of
 It is interesting to note that although many followers of John Rawls also seem to have an essentially
ﬁrst person singular starting point, there is a way in which Rawls himself also starts with the
“we.” For Rawls himself is clear that the question of justice has to do with the distribution of the
social product and his starting point is the idea that “society is a cooperative venture for mutual
advantage.” Thus, Rawls’s theory takes as its starting point the fact that those in the sphere of justice
are engaged in some sort of shared collective cooperative activity. Rawls’s theory of justice has to
do with how to share the beneﬁts and burdens of social cooperation, and so the sphere of justice
presupposes a background of shared cooperative activity. Thus, he argues that the principles of
social justice “provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and
they deﬁne the appropriate distribution of the beneﬁts and burdens of social cooperation” (Rawls
:). This stress on the sharing of the collective social product is central to Rawls’s account, thus
he points out that, “In a well-ordered society individuals acquire claims to a share of the social
product by doing certain things encouraged by the existing arrangements. The legitimate expecta-
tions that arise are the other side, so to speak, of the principle of fairness and the natural duty of
justice. For in the way that one has a duty to uphold just arrangements, and an obligation to do
one’s part when one has accepted a position in them, so a person who has complied with the scheme
and done his share has a right to be treated accordingly by others. They are bound to meet his
legitimate expectations” ().
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the phenomenal world that are “human” in the morally relevant sense are
those bits of the world that we can interact with on the basis of mutual
respect. And learning how to recognize which bits of the world are
“human” in the morally relevant sense involves picking up on how we
are able to interact with various bits of the world; we can only learn which
parts of the world we can interact with morally by trying to so interact, and
being open to the possibility of such interaction.
The account I am suggesting has two implications that Kant himself
may not have accepted. Firstly, it suggests that it is an open question as to
whether there are non-biologically-human animals that are “human” in the
moral sense. Secondly, it suggests that being “human” in the morally
relevant sense may be something that comes in degrees rather than being
an either-or matter. The reason for this is because there are many diﬀerent
types of collaborative activity diﬀering in complexity, and there are indi-
viduals that are capable of engaging in certain types of collaborative
activities but not in others. For example, some severely autistic adults are
not able to engage in those cooperative activates that involve language. But
they may have the capacity to engage in other types of cooperative
activities. Although Kant himself may not have accepted these claims,
I believe that contemporary Kantian ethicists should welcome these
positions.
 Recognizing Humanity
In the previous section of this chapter I argued that, for Kant, the morally
relevant others are those capable of morality, and I have suggested that this
should be understood in terms of the capacity to engage in shared coopera-
tive activity. In this section I will examine what, if anything, justiﬁes our
judgment that a bit of the world has the capacity to be moral. There would
seem to be at least four possible options here. The ﬁrst three would provide
me with some theoretical justiﬁcation for my belief that John is a human
being in a morally relevant sense, the fourth denies such a theoretical
justiﬁcation is possible. In this chapter I will defend this ﬁnal option. The
four options are:
(a) That there is some theoretical criterion we can use to distinguish
between what falls under the concept “moral subject” and what does
not. In Kantian terminology this would imply that the concept
“moral subject” could be schematized (and that some sort of theoret-
ical deduction of the objective reality of this concept could be given).
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However, it seems clear that for Kant such an account is a non-
starter, and so I will not discuss this option any further in this
chapter.
(b) Inference to the best/only explanation.
(c) An argument from Analogy. I am justiﬁed in believing that I am a
moral subject and John is relevantly like me whereas the chair is not.
This is the argument suggested by Paul Guyer in a recent paper
(Guyer ).
(d) There is no theoretical justiﬁcation of my judgment that John is a
moral subject, so we must assume, as a postulate of practical reason,
that we have a non-theoretical but reliable capacity to recognize other
morally relevant subjects (and certain things, such as language, works
of art, etc., as the product of such subjects).
In this section I will focus on the ﬁnal two possibilities. I will argue that
the ﬁnal option is more plausible, both as an interpretation of Kant and as
an ethical position, than Guyer’s position. If I am right, then my judgment
that John is an end in himself has no theoretical justiﬁcation, not even a
probable one. Although I will focus on arguing against Guyer’s position,
I believe that most of my arguments against the argument from analogy
will also be telling against justiﬁcations that appeal to inference to the best
explanation.
Guyer begins his paper by examining Kant’s argument that I am
(practically) justiﬁed in judging myself to be free from the ﬁrst-person
perspective, and rightly notes that such an argument cannot be used from
the third-person perspective to judge that another person is a free moral
subject. This seems to be a problem for Kant for, as Guyer asks, “if I can
prove myself to be free and subject to the moral law, but if others are due
moral treatment from me only because they are free and rational beings
who are ends in themselves, how can I prove to myself that others are
indeed ends in themselves who must always be treated as such and never
merely as means?” (Guyer : ) Guyer’s solution is to suggest that
 Kant suggests such an account at the end of the Critique of Judgment. Here he writes, “If
I determine the causality of the human being with regard to certain products that are explicable
only by means of intentional purposiveness by thinking of it as an understanding, I do not have to
stop there, but can attribute this predicate to him as a well-known property, and I have cognition of
him by this means” (:). This is the only place I know of where Kant makes such a suggestion.
 “What Kant now oﬀers are arguments by means of which each of us may prove him- or herself free,
but not arguments by means of which any of us can prove that any or all others are free. Kant’s
arguments address the ﬁrst-person question of how I should choose to behave, not the third-person
question of whether I can hold others responsible for their actions” (Guyer :).
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our belief that others are free moral subjects can be justiﬁed by an
argument from analogy. Thus he argues that,
Kant never explicitly asks whether one can know that other human beings
actually possess free wills or attempts to prove it, presumably taking it to be
obvious to each of us that other human beings (and nothing else) are
actually rational beings. Yet it is clear that on Kant’s premises we can be
directly acquainted only with the outward appearances of other persons,
and cannot have any immediate knowledge of their inner states, let alone
of the noumenal reality behind that. So the attribution of any inner states at
all to others must presumably be based on analogy with our experience of our
own inner states, mediated by our assumptions about the connections between
our own states of inner sense and our own outwardly observable bodily states.
(Guyer :, my emphasis)
Now, as Guyer notes, Kant is committed to the view that analogical
arguments can only provide us with probability and never certainty, and so
he suggests that our belief in the existence of other subjects can at most be
“highly probable but not certain” and perhaps must ultimately be based on
“some sort of moral Pascalian wager.” Now, rather than thinking of this
as posing a problem Guyer suggests that, “uncertainty about the real
freedom of others could lead us to temper our retributive instincts with
humility and mercy. . . leaving us to be rigorous in our moral demands on
ourselves but merciful in our judgments about others” (Guyer : ).
Now, there is some textual evidence that Kant appeals to some form of
the argument from analogy in his empirical psychology. Thus, he suggests
in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View that a proper knowledge
of human nature needs to start from a ﬁrst person singular point of view,
namely with introspection (inner experience). Thus Kant argues that,
[k]nowledge of the human being through inner experience, because to a
large extent one also judges others according to it, is more important than
correct judgment of others, but nevertheless at the same time perhaps more
diﬃcult. . . So it is advisable and even necessary to begin with observed
appearances in oneself, and then to progress above all to the assertion of
certain propositions that concern human nature; that is to inner experience.
(Anth :)
 And here Guyer seems to mean “human beings” in the ﬁrst sense of being a member of the
biological species.
 “[T]he value of treating others morally if they really are free and rational beings is so high, and the
error of failing to treat them morally if they really are the kinds of beings who should be morally
treated would be so grave, that even just a probability – or indeed just the possibility – that the other
human bodies I observe and interact with are really also bearers of moral personality is enough to
make it rational to treat them as if they are” (Guyer :).
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And in his lectures he explicitly appeals to the argument from analogy,
arguing that,
I consider thinking beings . . . through experience, which happens in part
internally in myself, or externally, where I perceive other natures, and
cognize according to the analogy that they have with me; and that is
empirical psychology, where I consider thinking natures through experi-
ence. (V-Anth :)
These passages, however, are about the proper method of empirical
psychology and do not obviously concern moral status attribution. There
is no good reason to think that the proper methodology for predicting and
explaining the behavior of others should also provide an account or
justiﬁcation of how we recognize which bits of the world around us are
deserving of moral respect. So, the fact that Kant suggests a ﬁrst person
singular starting point and appeals to the argument for analogy in his
empirical psychology should not be taken as evidence that his account of
moral status attribution should also be thought of as appealing to an
argument from analogy. In addition, there has been some debate, even
with regard to his empirical psychology, of whether Kant really is commit-
ted to taking introspection as his starting point.
As we have seen, Guyer suggests that Kant thinks that my belief that
John is a moral subject can only be justiﬁed by an argument from analogy.
I believe, however, that there is an alternative explanation that is both
morally more plausible and Kantian in spirit, namely that such beliefs
cannot and do not need to be justiﬁed theoretically. Instead I assume that
I have a reliable but non-theoretical capacity to immediately ascribe moral
status to others and although we cannot know theoretically that this
capacity is reliable we must assume for moral reasons (as a postulate of
practical reason) that this capacity is reliable, in that it is capable of reliably
picking out those parts of the phenomenal world that are demanding of
respect. Kant himself seems committed to the view that certain capacities
 Thus, for example, Thomas Sturm has argued that for Kant the proper starting point of empirical
psychology is not introspection but the observation of the external actions of ourselves and others.
Thus, he argues that from “at least the s on, [Kant] advances a methodological claim against
introspection as the primary method of knowing the human mind. He claims that one can
experience “the state of one’s own mind . . . through attention to one’s own actions just as well”
(Sturm :), and he continues to claim that, “[o]ur vocabulary of representations, thoughts,
feelings, passions, traits of personal character, and so on, is intimately connected to a careful
observation of human action and human life as it occurs and as it can be observed, especially in
society (:–). ‘Psychological phenomena’ are open to public observation in Kant’s view,
contrary to what Nayak and Sotnak and others have claimed” (). Sturm’s Interpretation has
been forcefully criticized by Patrick R. Frierson (:–).
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are necessary (albeit subjective) conditions of morality. He makes this clear
in theMetaphysics of Morals where he argues that, “[t]here are certain moral
endowments such that anyone lacking them could have no duty to acquire
them. – they are moral feeling, conscience, love of one’s neighbor and respect
for oneself (self-esteem). There is no obligation to have these because they
lie at the basis of morality, as subjective conditions of receptiveness to the
concept of duty. . . All of them are natural predispositions of the mind. . .”
(TL :). I suggest that our capacity to recognize the humanity of others
should be thought of as one of the aesthetic presuppositions of morality.
Indeed, the natural predisposition to love one’s neighbor presumably
involves a capacity to recognize one’s neighbor.
This capacity is manifested in our capacity to immediately recognize
noise as meaningful speech, to hear a scream as a cry for help. I think that
thinking of this moral capacity to recognize others in terms of hearing is
very Kantian in spirit, as much of the vocabulary Kant uses when talking of
reason and understanding has to do with hearing. For example, the main
activity of understanding is bestimmen (to determine) which, of course, has
the root stimme (voice). And as Allen Wood points out, “Kant’s German
word for ‘reason’ (Vernunft) is derived from the verb vernehmen, which
means to hear, and more speciﬁcally to understand what you hear.”
I suggest then that ultimately, for Kant, a rational being or moral subject is
something that has a voice (and so can make moral demands) and can
listen (vernehmen) to the moral demands of others. It can make demands
and understand the demands of others. And I believe that this capacity to
understand (vernehmen) the voice of the other is immediate. To argue that
there is some sort of (unconscious?) argument from analogy going on here
does not ﬁt in with our moral phenomenology. I don’t think that I hear
the baby scream and quickly and unconsciously think that the baby is like
me and so its crying must be a call for help, but instead I believe that I just
immediately hear the screams of the child as a cry for help, as a moral
demand. And Kant believes that such demands are irresistible. If I do not
 Wood :.
 I believe that this is what Kant is getting at in the Opus Postumum, where he repeatedly deﬁnes the
human being as a being with both rights and duties. (Here he opposes the human being to God
who is a being with only rights).
 Although his moral ear may have been closed to the cries of babies (and the singing of prisoners):
“A child that comes into the world apart from marriage is born outside the law (for the law
is marriage) and therefore outside the protection of the law. It has, as it were, stolen into the
commonwealth (like contraband merchandise), so that the commonwealth can ignore its existence
(since it was not right that it should have come to exist this way), and can therefore also ignore its
annihilation” (MM :). No one is perfect.
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block my moral ear and If do not drown out the cry for help with other
voices I cannot but help to react to it. This capacity to make and
recognize demands of others, is at the heart of what it is to be “human”
in the morally relevant sense. Now, I suggested that this capacity can be
thought of in terms of having a “voice,” but I think that having such a
voice does not necessarily require natural language. For, as we shall see,
pre-linguistic young babies are capable of making and recognizing such
demands. And perhaps some members of other species are too.
I believe such an account is more plausible ethically than Guyer’s
account. Explaining our belief in the existence of other moral subjects as
resting on probabilistic reasoning also does a bad job of explaining evil
acts. I think that the Nazi who refuses to see the Jew in front of him as a
human being is not making a bad analogical inference, but is refusing to
recognize the humanity of the person suﬀering in front of him. He is
refusing to hear the scream as a cry for help. Doing bad things to other
people is often very diﬃcult. Thus, John Doris points out that “The
Einsatzgruppen shot thousands of jews in the back of the neck, one by one,
so there was very close contact with the victims. They were apparently
expected to work for only an hour at a time, despite the fact that this task
was not physically demanding, and they were liberally provided with
alcohol” (Doris : ). Christopher Browning makes clear in his book
based upon the reports of members of a German police unit that was given
the order to massacre Jews in Poland, shutting out the voices and demands
 For a fuller account of the irresistibility of the voice of conscience, see my paper “The Point of
Studying Ethics According to Kant” (Thorpe: ). See also Sticker .
 And I believe that for Kant, evil acts can be done by good people. I think this is true even in the case
for Nazis. This belief is, in part, based upon my experience as a tour guide in Europe. I sometimes
gave “Holocaust Tours” and we sometimes organized meetings with ex-members of the Hitler
youth who were fervent Nazis in their youth and now met with groups of mainly Jewish visitors
at the Wansee Conference house, where the decision on the “ﬁnal solution” was made. These
ex-members of the Hitler youth were rabidly anti-Semitic (and evil?) in their teens, but the judg-
ment of most of the participants at the meeting were that they were good people (now).
 Thus, for example, in his discussion of the Milgram experiments, where subjects were showed a
remarkable willingness to administer seemingly painful shocks to a confederate of the experimenter,
John Doris argues that, “the most striking feature of the demonstration is not blind obedience but
conﬂicted obedience. Horribly conﬂicted obedience: Subjects were often observed to ‘sweat,
tremble, stutter, bite their lips, groan and dig their ﬁngernails into their ﬂesh’ (Milgram).” And
he suggests that historical studies, especially of the Holocaust, suggest that such conﬂict was not
merely a result of the experimental circumstances (Doris :–). The quote from Milgram is
from :.
  
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316421888.007
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Access paid by the UCSB Libraries, on 09 Sep 2018 at 08:54:02, subject to the Cambridge
of the victims was very diﬃcult indeed, at least for most of the perpetra-
tors. Now, the Nazis made numerous ﬁlms that were made for the
purpose of convincing viewers that certain groups, such as Jews and the
physically and mentally disabled, were not really human and their lives
were “not worth living.” Some of these ﬁlms were made speciﬁcally to
“help” the perpetrators deal with their “diﬃcult work.” But even for
most of those committed to the ideology, killing was not easy. Surely an
argument from analogy is not that hard to shut oﬀ?
Finally, I disagree with Guyer’s suggestion that our uncertainty about
the moral status of other human bodies around us as free moral subjects
could be the basis for us “to temper our retributive instincts with humility
and mercy” (Guyer :). If a person does something morally wrong,
surely to doubt their status as a moral subject will not lead us to humility
and mercy but may instead lead us to think of them as rabid dogs. Yes, it
may remove our retributive instincts, for one does not punish a rabid dog,
but I am not sure that such doubt will lead to moral compassion. As an
alternative I suggest that, for Kant our attitude of humility and mercy, the
need to treat ourselves harshly and others gently for our and their moral
failings, is not based on a skepticism about whether or not the person in
front of us is a free moral subject but on a skepticism about whether the
evil acts of others are really an indication that they do not actually have
good wills. When confronted by evil or bad acts we may be tempted to
believe that the individual that committed these acts has an evil will. The
skepticism that leads to compassion and humility is one that doubts
whether such acts are an indication of a bad will. A skepticism that does
not doubt the voice of our moral ear that tells us that the body in front of
us is a human being and demanding of respect, but doubts that their evil
actions are really a manifestation of an evil will. The fact that a virtuous
agent can do appalling things is, I believe, central to Kantian ethics. For a
virtuous person is not, for Kant, someone who has a perfect or holy will,
but is instead someone who is striving for such moral perfection. As such, a
 Browning . It is based on the same documentary evidence that Daniel Goldhagen used for his
later and unfortunately better known book Hitler’s Willing Executioners (), and reaches a very
diﬀerent, and in my eyes, a far more plausible conclusion.
 One of these ﬁlms is called “A life not worth living” and was made to be shown to doctors involved
in the “Euthanasia” program against the physically and mentally disabled.
 Thus Kant explains that, “Now through experience we can indeed notice unlawful actions, and also
notice (at least within ourselves) that they are consciously contrary to law. But we cannot observe
maxims, we cannot do so unproblematically even within ourselves; hence the judgment that an
agent is an evil human being cannot reliably be based on experience” (RGV :). Similar passages
are not hard to ﬁnd.
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virtuous person is someone who slowly converges on holiness over time,
who over their life slowly gives in to the temptation of listening to their
conscience and the moral demands of others. Now, such a process may
involve a long series of two steps forward and one step back. But if we
think that having a good will does not consist in always doing the right
things, but in terms of having a phenomenal character that slowly con-
verges on doing the right thing (gladly), then we can always be skeptical
about whether a particular bad act, or any ﬁnite series of bad acts, is
necessarily the manifestation of a vicious character. We can always be
forgiving, merciful, and humble because we can always tell ourselves that
we do not know where in their life the seemingly vicious person in front of
us is. For all we know they may be in the middle of a step back rather than
two steps forward. At least for me, this ﬁts with my moral intuitions. If, for
example, I catch a student plagiarizing and decide to be merciful, this is
not because I think “maybe she is not free, maybe she is just a machine
that has been programmed by the society around her,” but because I think
“she is young, she will grow older and hopefully better.”
 The Capacity to Recognize Humanity and Recent Research
in Developmental Psychology
Up until this point in the chapter I have been primarily interested in
defending an interpretation of Kant’s position. I have argued that Kant
believes that we have no criterion of principle for judging which bits of the
world around us are human in the morally relevant sense, but that a
Kantian should assume as a postulate of practical reason that we possess
a reliable capacity to recognize the humanity of others. In this ﬁnal section,
drawing on recent research in developmental psychology, I will brieﬂy
suggest a more sophisticated naturalistic version of this thesis. This
research suggests that we are born with an innate capacity to recognize
other human beings, and in particular to distinguish between human faces
and other images and between human voices and other sounds, and that
at a very early age humans, unlike non-human animals, begin to develop a
capacity to engage in joint cooperative activity. And I have argued that
 As Janet Wayne Astington argues, “Looking at faces, listening to voices, babies seem tuned into
people right from the start. They are born that way. . . It is not that all their understanding is innate
but that they have innate predispositions and these help them to distinguish one person from
another and from other things in the world” (Astington :).
 And this research suggests that the capacity to engage in joint cooperative activities presupposes
a capacity for sophisticated joint attention (which also seems to be a capacity lacking in all other
  
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316421888.007
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Access paid by the UCSB Libraries, on 09 Sep 2018 at 08:54:02, subject to the Cambridge
what it is to be human (in a morally relevant sense) is to be a being we
can engage in shared cooperative activities with. If this is the case, then
we have no criterion or principle to pick out which bits of the world
are human in the morally relevant sense, for the only way we have of
establishing whether a being is the sort we can engage in a joint cooperative
activity with is to try and do so. If the conclusions of this research are
correct then the more sophisticated version of my thesis is, the capacity to
recognize other human beings is either innate or develops over the ﬁrst two
years after birth and that, as a postulate of practical reason, we must
assume that this natural capacity is able to reliably pick out human beings
in a morally relevant sense.
Although the seemingly innate capacity to recognize faces and distin-
guish between voices and other sounds is obviously not a capacity to
recognize human beings in a morally relevant sense, it seems likely that
such capacities are at the basis of the more complex capacity to engage in
joint cooperative activity that seems to develop slowly between the ages of
six months and two years – the capacity to engage in joint cooperative
activities. I believe that this capacity does lie at the heart of our capacity to
recognize morally relevant others, as, for a Kantian, the morally relevant
others are those we can engage in joint cooperative activities with. In the
previous section of this chapter I criticized Guyer’s reading of Kant. Guyer
suggested that Kant’s position that our judgment that someone or some-
thing is a morally relevant other is based on an argument from analogy.
I criticized this as a reading of Kant. In this section I will argue that even if
this were a correct reading of Kant, contemporary research would suggest
that it is false, for our capacity to engage in joint cooperative activities
clearly seems to develop before we develop (and hence does not depend
on) the capacity to engage in complex analogical reasoning.
Starting in the s Jean Piaget, basing his research on the verbal
responses of young children, reached the conclusion that young children
cannot distinguish between people and things nor between thoughts and
things. This remained the orthodoxy for many decades. More recent
research, however, using diﬀerent techniques, primarily the habituation/
non-human animals) and that in healthy infants this capacity for joint attention uses the innate
capacities to recognize faces and to distinguish between voices and other sounds.
 Elsewhere I argue that Kant’s ethics should be understood as an “ethics of interaction,” for the idea
of a realm of ends is the idea of a community in which there is real interaction, and so, for Kant, to
be moral is to strive to really interact with others. I am suggesting here that we should understand
interaction in terms of engaging in joint cooperative activities.
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dishabituation methodology, has suggested that Piaget’s ﬁndings were
false. Recent studies suggest that even in the ﬁrst months, and probably
even hours, young babies seem to have the capacity to distinguish between
people and things. In particular, these studies seem to show a discrimin-
ating response between human faces and voices on the one hand, and non-
human patterns and noises on the other.
Facial recognition in young infants. Astington, writing in ,
explains that, “although some researchers have found that two-month-olds
prefer a face over other patterns of equal complexity, generally this work
has shown that babies don’t reliably show this preference until four or ﬁve
months of age. However, research using real faces, which are moving and
three-dimensional as well as having contrast and complexity, has shown
that much younger infants, even those two or three days old, can discrimi-
nate between their mothers face and that of a stranger” (Astington : ).
More recent research seems to suggest that the capacity to distinguish
faces from other patterns is present from birth. Thus Bushnell, in a 
study, writes that “There is no doubt that the human infant is capable of
face discrimination and face recognition within a surprisingly short time
after birth” (Bushnell :) and provides evidence from an experiment
on  newborns that within  hours of birth young infants are able to
remember their mothers’ faces. Mondloch et al. () provide evidence
that six-week-old infants have a marked visual preference for the human
face. In addition, young infants are able to distinguish between human
faces and faces of other species (De Haan et al. ). There is even
evidence to suggest that babies as young as four months discriminate
between attractive and unattractive faces (Samuels et al. ). One
interesting result suggested by Pascalis, Haan, and Nelson is that the
human capacity to recognize faces is generic but begins to narrow after
about three months, “becoming more human face speciﬁc” (Pascalis et al.
). This study suggests that young infants (six months) are actually
better at distinguishing between the faces of individual monkeys than
 Astington quite clearly explains this methodology in the following terms: “We keep showing her the
same things time and time again until she is bored with it and doesn’t look at it for very long; she is
habituated to it. Then we show her something diﬀerent. Does she spend longer looking at the new
thing or does she seem bored with it as the one she has seen repeatedly? If she spends longer, that is,
if she dishabituates, we know it seems diﬀerent to her from what she was looking at before”
(Astington :).
 The evidence of this experiment suggests that even within the ﬁrst three days of birth “an increased
opportunity to view the mother’s face is associated with stronger visual preference levels” (Bushnell
:).
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slightly older infants (nine months). In this study, six-month-old infants,
nine-month-old infants, and adults were shown pictures of both monkey
and human faces, and only the youngest group showed signs of discrimin-
ation between individuals of both species. That is, six-month-olds showed
signs of discriminating between monkey Bob and monkey Bill. Nine-
month-olds and adults did not.
The capacity to distinguish between voices and other sounds in very
young infants. Astington writes that, “(n)ewborns can also distinguish
their mother’s voice from that of someone else. They are startled by
sudden noises and soothed by rhythmic music, but it is human voices
they really seem to listen to. A crying baby may stop crying when he hears
his mother’s voice; another baby, lying quietly, may start to kick excitedly
when her father starts to talk to her” (Astington :).
Once again, Ashington’s claims seem to be conﬁrmed by recent experi-
mental evidence. For example, in a classic study of four-day-old French
infants, Mahler et al. have shown that four-day-old infants “distinguish
utterance in their native language from those of another language” (Mehler
et al. :). And in a recent study, Vouloumanos and Werker argue
that “humans are born with a preference for listening to speech” and cite
recent studies that seem to show that newborn infants are “sensitive to
word boundaries, distinguish between rhythmically dissimilar languages,
distinguish between stress patterns of multisyllabic words, categorically dis-
criminate lexical versus grammatical words and diﬀerentiate between good
and poor syllable forms.” There is a great amount of additional research
that suggests that the capacity to distinguish between the human and the
non-human, in very sophisticated ways, is found at a very early age.
Now, of course, these seemingly innate capacities to recognize faces and
distinguish between speech and other sounds are not themselves capacities
to recognize the humanity of others in any moral sense. However, I suggest
 Vouloumanos et al. :. Worried that past studies may have only showed a preference for
speech over white noise, in their study Vouloumanos and Werker show that newborns discriminate
between speech and “complex non-speech analogues” that “were modeled on sine-wave analogues
of speech” ().
 For example, Tomasello claims that “Infants recognize self-produced, biological motion within a
few months after birth, and they soon turn to look in the same direction as other persons as well. By
around six months of age, infants have developed suﬃcient expectations about human animate
actions to be able to predict what others will do in familiar situations. Thus, for example, using
habituation methodology, Woodward found that infants of this age expect people (speciﬁcally,
human hands) to do such things as reach for objects they were just reaching for previously. Infants
do not expect inanimate objects that resemble human hands (e.g., a garden-tool claw) to ‘reach’
toward the familiar object in similar circumstances” (:).
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that, in healthy infants, these basic innate capacities play a role in the more
complex capacity to engage in joint cooperative activity, and I argue that
this capacity lies at the heart of our capacity to recognize the humanity of
others in a moral sense.
The capacity to engage in shared cooperative activity and declara-
tive pointing. The previous two capacities do not, in themselves, seem to
be moral capacities, although they probably play a role in the genesis and
development of the fully moral capacities. I have suggested that a central
role in the development of moral capacities is played by the capacity to
engage in joint cooperative activity. One aspect of our capacity to recog-
nize the humanity of others has to do with declarative pointing, and our
capacity to recognize such pointing as an invitation to look. Declarative
pointing, which seems to be uniquely human, is pointing “for the sake of
sharing attention to some outside entity, or to inform others of things
cooperatively, as humans often do” (Moll and Tomasello : ). Such
pointing can be understood as an invitation to look, and I have argued that
recognizing such activity is best thought of as picking up on a social
aﬀordance, that is picking up on the possibility of a certain type of
interaction. One reason why I feel it is important to discuss the capacity
of declarative pointing is because this is a capacity to initiate a certain type
of collaborative activity that seems to develop before human infants
develop linguistic capacities. Given the fact that I have suggested “human-
ity” in the morally relevant sense should be identiﬁed with the capacity to
engage in joint or shared cooperative activities, the facts I will discuss
subsequently suggest that being “human” should not be identiﬁed with the
possession of linguistic capacities. I will follow the account of the develop-
ment of the capacity to point and engage in shared cooperative activity as
oﬀered by Michael Tomasello and his team. And it should be pointed out
that his account is quite conservative in that it suggests a quite late
development of these capacities in the normally developing human infant.
Other researchers, such as Vasudevi Reddy have suggested that the cap-
acity to engage in shared cooperative activity emerges much earlier in
infant development and is, for example, manifested in the dyadic sharing
 Now, of course, such capacities will not be singularly necessary for the development of the capacity
to recognize humanity (in a moral sense), for obviously blind and deaf individuals are capable of
morality, but taken together a child who was born without any innate capacity to distinguish
sensitively between the human and non-human might not be able to develop such a capacity. In
addition, sociopaths, if there are any, are presumably born with these capacities, and so these
capacities will not be suﬃcient. But my suggestion is that such innate capacities probably play a role
in the development of our moral capacity.
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of emotions between mothers and their babies (see Reddy ). I am
sympathetic to Reddy’s account, but for my purposes, the important point
to establish is that this capacity develops before the development of
linguistic abilities. And even on a conservative account of the developmen-
tal sequence, such as Tomasello’s, the capacity to initiate joint cooperative
activities through pointing develops prior to the development of linguistic
capacities. Indeed, Tomasello himself believes that these pre-linguistic
capacities are what make the development of linguistic capacities possible
as the semantic character of language essentially involves reference, and our
capacity to refer is rooted in our capacity for joint attention and pointing.
And so the possession of these capacities is a necessary condition for the
development of language.
Declarative pointing is a complex activity and presupposes a number of
other capacities. Pointing in normally developing human infants begins in
the months around the ﬁrst birthday, prior to the emergence of linguistic
abilities (Tomasello :). Evidence suggests that young infants start
to point communicatively for two motives: to request things and to share
emotions (Tomasello :). Tomasello distinguishes between two
types of declaratives: (a) “declaratives as expressives” are those which the
infant uses to share an attitude with an adult about a common referent and
(b) “declaratives as informatives” which are used by the infant to provide
the adult with information. And he cites experimental evidence that
suggests that the ﬁrst manifestation of cooperative pointing in infants
starts with expressive pointing, which begins at about  months. Thus,
Liszkowski et al. conducted a series of experiments to test the motivation
for pointing in -month-old infants (Liszkowski et al. ). They
introduced novel objects that would appear at some distance, and experi-
mentally manipulated the adult’s reaction, to test whether the infant’s
intention was to share their attitude (surprise, or interest in the novel
object). The adults could react in one of four ways: () looking at the event
without looking at the infant (Event Condition), () emoting positively
toward the infant without looking at the event (Face Condition), () doing
nothing (Ignore Condition) or, () alternating their gaze between the
infant and the event while emoting positively (Joint Attention/Share
Condition). The results showed that,
when the adult simply looked to the indicated referent while ignoring the
infant (Event condition), or when the adult simply expressed positive
emotions to the infant while ignoring the indicated referent (Face condi-
tion), infants were not satisﬁed. In comparison with the Joint Attention
condition, in which infants typically gave one long point, infants in these
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conditions (as well as in the Ignore condition) tended to repeat their
pointing gesture more often within trials – apparently as persistent attempts
to establish shared attention and interest. Moreover, infants in these condi-
tions (as well as in the Ignore condition) pointed less often across trials than
in the Joint Attention condition – apparently indicating growing dissatis-
faction with this adult as a communicative partner since she did not
respond by sharing infants’ attitude to the referent. (Tomasello : )
This and other experiments that show the pre-linguistic infants engag-
ing in pointing in order to share their emotional attitudes with others are
signiﬁcant, as they show a capacity and motivation to engage in some sort
of joint activity (in this case joint attention) prior to the development of
linguistic development. Now one may ask why we should consider the
sharing of emotions in joint attention as a form of joint cooperative
activity. Now, Tomasello argues, rightly in my opinion, that “The sine
qua non of collaborative action is a joint goal and a joint commitment
among participants to pursue it together, with a mutual understanding
among all that they share this joint goal and commitment” (Tomasello
: ). And I take it that in the sharing of excitement with an infant
about an object, the evidence suggests that there is a joint goal (namely to
share the excitement) and a joint commitment, evidenced by the infants
attempts to re-engage if the adult disengages. And it seems plausible to
assume that the infant recognizes that the adult shares the goal. So, I think
there is good reason to think that even the sharing of excitement about a
new object with an infant counts as a simple form of joint collaborative
activity.
There is also experimental evidence that -month-old infants also
point declaratively to help adults by providing them with information
they may need. These experiments involve adults searching for a misplaced
object. And the results show that -month-old infants often point to the
object to help the adult with their search (Tomasello :). Toma-
sello argues that such behavior presupposes an understanding that others
can have or lack information, plus an altruistic motive. I would add that
such behavior shows the beginning of a capacity to recognize others as ends
in themselves, who one can help in the pursuit of their own ends.
A further, morally relevant capacity is the capacity for role reversal.
Young human infants are able to play games that involve distinct roles:
such as a giver and a receiver. Once they have learnt the game having
played one of the roles they are able to play the same game taking the other
role. Such an ability involves the capacity to take a “birds eye” view of
the activity and to recognize that there are diﬀerent roles that diﬀerent
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individuals can take. This capacity to understand that roles in an activity
are fungible and can be played by diﬀerent individuals is important for
being able to see things from the perspective of others and is probably
necessary for the capacity to decide whether a certain type of activity is
universalizable. Once again there is some evidence to suggest that this
capacity is unique to biological human beings.
In terms of how this empirical research is related to Kant’s ethics,
I would suggest that the capacity to engage in helpful informative declara-
tives is related to the second formulation of the categorical imperative (the
formulation of respect for humanity), for it shows the beginning of the
capacity to recognize and incorporate the ends of others into one’s own
ends. The capacity to engage in expressive declaratives, with the intention
to share attention, is related to the third formulation of the categorical
imperative as it shows the capacity and desire for creating a “we.” What is
important to the infant is that we are looking at the object of interest
together and sharing our emotions. And there is a normative element to
this shared attention as the infant demands that we look and share the
emotion, and is concerned to re-engage us if we do not share the moment.
Although a -month-old baby is clearly not capable of fully moral agency,
I suggest that these two capacities show some form of moral agency. And
organisms capable of such activities are demanding of some moral respect.
I have suggested that rather than being a binary either-or matter, the
capacity for moral agency comes in degrees, and if what is demanding of
respect is the capacity for moral agency, then the sort of respect that is
required is also something that comes in degrees depending on the type of
moral agency of the organism concerned. If I am right, then someone who
systematically refuses to engage with infants who are attempting, for
example, to engage in sharing of emotions is failing to show respect for
humanity.
 “But in a series of simple cooperative tasks in which a human played one role and the chimpanzee a
complementary role – for example, the human held out a plate and the chimpanzee placed a toy on
it – when the human forced a role reversal chimpanzees basically either did not reverse roles, or else
they performed their action without reference to the human. In a similar series of tasks, human
infants not only reversed roles, but when they did so they looked expectantly to the adult in
anticipation of her playing her new role in their shared task. . . Our interpretation is that human
infants understand joint activity from a ‘bird’s-eye view,’ with the joint goal and complementary
roles all in a single representational format – which enables them to reverse roles as needed. In
contrast, chimpanzees understand their own action from a ﬁrst-person perspective and that of the
partner from a third-person perspective, but they do not have a bird’s-eye view of the interaction –
and so there really are no roles, and so no sense in which they can reverse roles, in ‘the same’
activity” (Tomasello :–).
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I have suggested that the work of Tomasello and his associates suggests
that -month-old babies are deserving of some degree of moral respect.
And the work of Reddy and others suggests that the capacities that
Tomasello thinks develop at around  months develop earlier in infancy.
This raises the question of whether there are non-human animals that are
deserving of some degree of moral respect (rather than mere compassion).
Here I think the empirical evidence is inconclusive.
Many animals are territorial. And one question concerning our moral
relationship to non-human animals has to do with whether we should
respect their territories. There is often conﬂict between humans and non-
human animals regarding territory. And such conﬂict is often the result of
humans encroaching on the territory of non-human animals. There are
many moral reasons to recognize and protect various animal species, and
this may involve recognizing their territories. But there is a further ques-
tion as to whether we should recolonize non-human animals as having
some sort of property rights to their territories. Here, I believe the Kantian
response would have to do with whether non-human animal species are
capable of anything like mutual respect and have the capacity to recognize
that they are sharing the land with us. And here the evidence is inconclu-
sive. Many non-human animals are clearly able to recognize boundaries
between, say, the forest and cultivated lands, and show behavior diﬀer-
ences in terms of how they forage in cultivated land. So, for example,
Sukumar points out that “Adult Asian elephant bulls are predominantly
solitary during their daytime movements in the wild. I noticed, however, a
distinct tendency among bulls to associate with each other while raiding
crop ﬁelds at night” (Sukumar :). This diﬀerential behavior
clearly indicates that elephants recognize a diﬀerence between forest land
and cultivated land. But such behavior may just be a result of learning
about diﬀerent risks involved in foraging in cultivated land. From the
evidence I have examined it is unclear whether any non-human animals
living in proximity to humans are able to mutually respect the territory of
one another, and I think a Kantian should take this capacity as the basis
for whether we should regard non-human animals as being subjects of
property rights.
Also relevant is whether non-human animals are capable of altruistic
behavior and whether they are able to treat others as ends rather than
merely as means. Comparative research by Tomasello and his associates on
the pointing capacities of human infants and chimpanzees suggests that
 See, for example, Chatterjee , Leblan , Sukumar , chapter  and chapter .
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chimpanzees are able to interact with others, but only see others as social
tools to be used, rather than ends in themselves. If this research is reliable,
it would suggest that chimpanzees are not capable of relationships based on
mutual respect. Thus, they claim that although chimpanzees do not point
in the wild, chimpanzees who have had experience of contact with humans
do learn to point imperatively. They point out, however, that,
Importantly though, they use this manual gesture imperatively only. That
is, they point for humans either in order to obtain a desirable object from
them directly . . . or indirectly by requesting from the human to provide the
necessary conditions for them to get the object themselves. . . It thus seems
that what the apes have learned from their experience with humans is that
the human will help them, and that they can use the pointing gesture
instrumentally in order to make him help them. They thus “use” the
human as a “social tool” in order to get things they otherwise could not
get, and they have learned that pointing gets this tool to work. . . However,
no ape has ever been observed to point for another ape or for a human
declaratively – that is, just for the sake of sharing attention to some outside
entity, or to inform others of things cooperatively, as humans often do.
(Moll and Tomasello :)
Tomasello also argues that chimpanzees have very limited motivations
for altruistic behavior. Indeed, he thinks that chimpanzees are fundamen-
tally competitive and lack the motivation and the skills to engage in
collaborative activity (Tomasello :). And he suggests that the
development of altruistic, cooperative motivation was the ﬁrst major
development in the evolution of humanity away from the other apes.
And other apes show very limited motivation to help others, especially in
situations involving food.
If Tomasello is right, this would suggest that although chimpanzees may
be subjects of compassion, they are not objects of respect in the Kantian
sense. However, Tomasello’s research has been questioned by a number of
prominent primatologists. One major criticism is methodological. Toma-
sello’s research is primarily in the form of laboratory experiments, and
some primatologists believe that in such unnatural settings the capacities
they are interested in are less likely to manifest themselves, and that a more
ethological approach is required. So, for example, de Waal has shown that
chimpanzees in the wild show a pattern to share food in exchange for
 Thus Tomasello argues that “chimpanzees sometimes help humans and one another. . . they do not
help others in situations in which they themselves have a chance to obtain food – even when it
would be easy for them to do so at no cost” (p.). For empirical support for these claims see: Silk
et al. ; Jensen et al. ; and Warneken and Tomasello  and .
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grooming, which suggests some capacity for reciprocity, which De Waal
labels reciprocal altruism (de Waal ). Such food sharing is, he argues,
governed by turn-taking conventions and he even suggests that such
sharing leads to some form of mutual obligation (de Waal ). And
Sarah F. Brosnan and de Waal have even presented some evidence that
capuchin monkeys have some sense of fairness (Brosnan and de Waal
). The interpretation of the experiments that claim to show a concern
for fairness among monkeys has, however, been questioned by Tomasello
and his research group.
The empirical research, then, on whether or not there are non-human
animals that have some sort of moral capacities is inconclusive. And there
is, on the account I have oﬀered, no criterion or principle we can apply to
determine who we are capable of engaging in joint cooperative activities
with; the only way of ﬁnding this out is by trying, and for us to have an
openness to the invitations being made to us by the world around us. To
recognize that another bit of the phenomenal world is “human” in the
morally relevant sense is not to categorize that part of the world by
applying a concept that has necessary and suﬃcient conditions of applica-
tion, but to pick up on the possibility of a certain type of interaction. The
fact that we have not succeeded in engaging in joint cooperative activities
with non-human nature does not mean that such activities are impossible.
It might just mean that we have not tried hard enough. And the empirical
research on this issue is inconclusive.
In terms of how we go about recognizing morally relevant others,
I believe that the best answer to this question is most likely to be provided
by psychologists like Tomasello who are trying to understand the psycho-
logical basis and development of our capacity to engage in joint coopera-
tive activities.
 Bräuer, Call, and Tomasello  and .
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